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Abstract—We introduce a methodology for efficient monitoring
of processes running on hosts in a corporate network. The
methodology is based on collecting streams of system calls
produced by all or selected processes on the hosts, and sending
them over the network to a monitoring server, where machine
learning algorithms are used to identify changes in process
behavior due to malicious activity, hardware failures, or software
errors. The methodology uses a sequence of system call count
vectors as the data format which can handle large and varying
volumes of data.
Unlike previous approaches, the methodology introduced in
this paper is suitable for distributed collection and processing of
data in large corporate networks. We evaluate the methodology
both in a laboratory setting on a real-life setup and provide statis-
tics characterizing performance and accuracy of the methodology.
Index Terms—anomaly detection, malware, system calls, pro-
cess monitoring, LSTM
I. INTRODUCTION
System call streams are enormous, and an efficient represen-
tation with performance guarantees independent of the level
of activity on the host must be used. Some earlier work was
based on processing of sequential streams of system calls [1],
[2], which does not scale well — a single process can produce
tens of thousands system calls per second, with hundreds of
processes running on each host, or end point. Other approaches
rely on computing frequencies of short sequences (n-grams)
of system calls over a fixed time window [3], [4]. However, in
this case information about temporal dynamics of the process
is lost.
Further on, both from security and performance points of
view some of the processing is sent from the monitored host
to the monitoring server — a different machine, dedicated to
the monitoring task. This poses additional restrictions on the
amount of data which can be collected: on the one hand, the
network load must stay within the allowed limits; on the other
hand, the machine executing the monitoring task must be able
to process data from multiple hosts in the network.
In this paper we introduce a new methodology for monitor-
ing networked computer systems based on system calls. The
methodology combines careful selection of information being
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gathered with employment of advanced machine learning
algorithms. We evaluate the methodology on a reproducible
real-life setup, as well as provide statistics for production-level
deployment of a monitoring system based on the methodology.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II surveys related
work on system call based monitoring. Section III describes
the overall structure of the solution and summarizes results
of the empirical evaluation. Section IV provides detailed
explanation and justification of the solution architecture and
technological choices, as well as addresses issues of data
collection. Section V provides empirical evaluation of the
methodology on a real-life setup, as well as statistics of a
production-level deployment. Finally, Section VI summarizes
paper contributions and suggests directions for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Research of system-call based techniques for process iden-
tification and anomaly detection has been conducted since the
1990s. [1] is the seminal work which pushed forward research
on methods and representations of operating system process
monitoring based on system call.
Main research directions are methods and models of process
behavior, on the one hand, and representation of system calls
and system call sequences, on the other hand.
[2] provides an early comparison of machine learning
methods for modeling process behavior. [5] introduces the
model of execution graph, and behavior similarity measure
based on the execution graph. [6] combines multiple models
into an ensemble to improve anomaly detection. [7] applies
continuous time Bayesian network (CTBN) to system call
processes to account for time-dependent features and address
high variability of system call streams over time. [8] applies
a deep LSTM-based architecture to sequences of individual
system calls, treating system calls as a language model.
Initially, only system call indices were used as features [1],
[2]. [3] compares three different representations of system
calls: n-grams of system call names, histograms of system call
names, and individual system calls with associated parameters.
[9] proposes the use of system call sequences of varying length
as features. [3], [10] investigate extracting features for machine
learning from arguments of system calls. [4] studies novel
techniques of anomaly detection and classification using n-
grams of system calls. [11] conducts an case study of n-gram
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2based feature selection for system-call based monitoring, and
analyses the influence of the size of the n-gram set and the
maximum n-gram length on detection accuracy.
This work differs from earlier work on anomaly detection
based on system calls in that:
• A distributed solution for high-volume large-scale net-
work is introduced, rather than just an algorithm for
monitoring of individual processes.
• The data representation combines both system-call fre-
quencies and temporal dynamics of process behavior.
The compromise between the amount of information
preserved and the volume of data collected and processed
can be tuned continuously with a small set of parameters.
• An efficient machine learning algorithm based on deep
architecture, capable of benefiting both from high dimen-
sionality of data and from learning temporal features of
operating system processes is employed.
III. METHODOLOGY OUTLINE AND MAIN RESULTS
We approach the following problem: the stream of system
calls of an operating system process is recorded in real time.
Based on the system call stream, we seek to detect when
the behavior of the process becomes anomalous, either due
to misconfiguration or malfunctioning, or due to malicious
activity of an attacker targeting the process.
An anomalous system call stream may correspond to one
or more of the following scenarios:
• Novelty — we cannot classify a process reliably, possibly
due to malfunctioning or an incompatible version.
• Non-grata — we identify a process which is known to
be malicious.
• Masquerade — a process which we reliably classify as
foo presents itself as bar.
Fortunately, all of the above scenarios can be solved through
multiclass classification of processes based on their system call
streams — and this is indeed the approach we took. Novelty
corresponds to classifying a process with low confidence.
Non-grata is classifying a process (with high confidence) as
belonging to a known malicious class. Finally, Masquerade
relies on the fact that every running process ‘presents’ itself,
that is, sends its own process name. Masquerade is realized if a
process is classified, with high confidence, to have a different
process name than the name the process pretends to bear.
Based on these scenarios, alerts can be issued and appropriate
correcting actions can be taken.
A. Solution Architecture
The overall architecture of the solution is shown in Figure 1.
The processing is distributed. The data is collected by an agent
program running on the end points. The data, aggregated over
time frames for efficiency, is sent over the network to the
data queue. The monitoring server consumes the data from the
queue. Based on classification outcomes, the monitoring server
may issue alerts when an anomalous event corresponding to
one of the described scenarios is likely to take place.
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Fig. 1: Solution architecture. System call data is sent from end
points to the monitoring server over the network.
There are a few tools [12], [13], [14] for collecting system
calls in real time. Our solution uses sysdig [14]. Sysdig facili-
tates efficient recording of system calls in a high performance
environment on modern Linux systems.
B. Representation of Data
The main challenge in implementing the solution is bound-
ing the amount of data collected and processed while preserv-
ing sufficient information for reliable classification. Using raw
system call logs is infeasible:
• A single moderately loaded host can produce a million
of system calls per second. Even for a single host the
task would be challenging. Our architecture implies that
data from many hosts is sent to the monitoring server for
centralized processing.
• Raw system call logs have long temporal dependencies
which are hard to learn: two system calls, one relying on
the outcome of the other, can be hundreds of system calls
apart.
• Although some previous research [3], [10] considered
using system call arguments for constructing features
for machine learning, we do not have a compact fixed-
dimensional representation for system call arguments
suitable for large-volume training and classification.
Consequently, we came up with a compact and easily
learnable format based on sequences of system call count
vectors:
• The data is a stream of vectors of integers, each vector is
≈ 300 integers, one per system call type (there are ≈ 300
system calls in Linux).
• Each vector corresponds to a fixed time interval t (e.g. 1
second).
• Each vector component represents the number of calls
issued during the time interval.
Let us consider an example. In this example we limit the
monitoring to first 6 system calls:
1) exit
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Fig. 2: Machine learning model for classification of system
call streams.
2) fork
3) read
4) write
5) open
6) close
Let us assume that process ‘foo’ performed the following
sequence of system calls during a certain second:
fork, open, read, write, read, write,
read, write, read
The count vector representing the first second is:
exit fork read write open close
0 1 3 2 1 0
Then, let us assume that during the next second we observe:
write, read, write, close, exit
The corresponding count vector is
exit fork read write open close
1 0 1 2 0 1
For input to machine learning model, the count vectors are
normalized and combined into batches. The normalized two-
second batch hence takes the following form:
sec exit fork read write open close
1 0.0 0.142 0.428 0.285 0.142 0.0
2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.2
Vectors of counts of system calls are collected and sent
for every monitored process at fixed short time intervals.
However, the monitoring server processes sequences of system
call vectors over longer time spans. This way, the performance
guarantee is maintained through sending fixed amount of data
per time unit independently of the activity on the host, but the
temporal behavior is at least partially preserved. By varying
the vector and sequence time durations, a balance between
network and CPU load, on the one hand, and monitoring
accuracy, on the other hand, can be adjusted depending on
performance and accuracy requirements.
C. Machine Learning Model
LSTM [15] (Long Short-Term Memory) deep learning ar-
chitecture is particularly suitable for processing of sequences
of system call count vectors. We use an LSTM network to
train a model which reliably identifies processes by their count
vector sequences and detects changes in their behavior.
The model structure is shown in Figure 2. The model
is composed of a single-layer LSTM, followed by a fully-
connected readout layer (FC), and a softmax layer (SM) for
classification. Details about the machine learning model and
algorithms are provided in Section IV.
D. Main Results
We evaluated the solution on a laboratory setup and de-
ployed the solution in the production environment. With 1-
second count vectors and 10-seconds sequence length, the
monitoring system achieves 90-93% accuracy for all scenarios.
A single multi-core monitoring server is able to handle a net-
work of 20,000 hosts. Empirical evaluation on the laboratory
setup and the production environment are further described in
Section V.
IV. MACHINE LEARNING ARCHITECTURE AND
METHODOLOGY
System calls are essentially sequential data and preserving
the chronological information is important. Indeed, a sequence
of system calls can be thought of as a sequence of words
composing a sentence, the ordering of the words being critical
to identify the meaning of the sentence. In order to preserve
the temporal aspect of the system calls, we employ an LSTM-
based architecture. LSTM is a type of recurrent neural network
introduced in [15] that maps sequences of variable lengths to
fixed dimensional vectors. It is particularly suitable for han-
dling sequences of words or systems calls since the sequences
can vary in length. LSTM is quite popular in the natural
language community where it has been successfully applied
to a vast variety of problems such as speech recognition or
machine translation.
We now describe different variants of architectures that
we experimented with. The architecture depicted in Figure 2
represents a neural network composed of a single-layer LSTM
followed by a fully connected layer. The LSTM receives as
input the sequence of count vectors in chronological order. We
refer to this architecture as simple net.
A slightly more complex architecture consists in two inde-
pendent LSTMs where one receives the sequence in chrono-
logical order while the other receives it in reverse order
(Figure 3). Such a network is called a bidirectional LSTM.
This bidirectional LSTM outputs two fixed size vectors that
are concatenated or averaged and fed to the following fully
connected layer. We refer to this architecture as bidirectional
net. A regular LSTM sees the sequence in chronological order
and disregards the dependence that a later element in the
sequence might have on one that precedes it. By allowing the
network to look at the sequence in reverse order we take into
account the dependence of the sequence in the other direction.
Finally, we experimented with an architecture that we called
inception-like net inspired by the inception module introduced
in [16]. Intuitively, considering a sequence at multiple scales
at the same time, i.e. with multiple values of the time interval
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Fig. 3: Machine learning model based on bidirectional LSTM.
t, might give additional insights. If we take the example of
a sentence, considering it as a sequence of words, but also
as a sequence of couple of words might be useful to better
understand the sentence. For an image, as discussed in [16],
looking at an image with sliding windows at various scales
helps making sense of features at different scales. Following
this idea, the inception-like net consists in multiple LSTMs
with tied-weights where each of them takes as input the same
sequence but with different values of the time interval t. The
different copies of the LSTM output fixed size vectors that are
concatenated and fed to a fully connected layer.
The simple net performance is at par or slightly worse
than with the more complex bidirectional net and inception-
like net. Since the increase in performance is not significant,
we opted for the simplest network. However, for the sake of
completeness, results of the different architectures are reported
in the next section.
V. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
We evaluated our methodology in a laboratory setup as well
as in production environment.1
A. Laboratory Setup
For the laboratory setup, we created a data collecting
framework as shown in Figure 4.
The setup consists of two hosts: the client and the server. A
number of processes are involved in the workings of the setup.
In the following description, the words in italic correspond
to processes or process groups. The hosts collect emails
from an external server. On the client, fetchmail is used to
retrieve emails from a web-based email provider via the IMAP
protocol. Then, procmail dispatches received emails, which
are then sent by postfix to the server via SMTP protocol.
The server’s postfix process receives the emails, passes them
through the amavis antivirus and stores in the local filesystem.
The dovecot process serves emails via the IMAP protocol. The
emails are retrieved by the client’s fetchmail, and stored in the
filesystem.
1The code and laboratory data used for the experiments are available at
http://github.com/michael135/count-vector-paper-experiments
fetchmail
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Fig. 4: Mail delivery client-server framework for evaluating
the methodology
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Fig. 5: Histogram of count vector counts per process
In addition to the mentioned processes or process groups,
other utility processes run the hosts and are monitored. The
setup is implemented as Docker [17] containers. In order to
provide sufficient volume and diversity of the data processed,
we opened a dedicated email account with a web-based email
service, and subscribed the email account to many promo-
tion and notification mailing lists, resulting in the average
frequency of one incoming email per minute. For the empirical
evaluation, we collected data from processes running both on
the client and on the server during one week. The distribution
of the count vectors lines is shown Figure 5
For the empirical evaluation, we selected the 28 processes
that are the most represented in our data and trained different
models that aimed at classifying the processes based on their
sequence of system calls. 80% of the data was used to train
the classifiers and results were calculated on the 20% left
out for testing. All the results reported for the LSTM-based
5architectures used LSTM with 64 hidden units and were
trained using the Adam optimizer with an initial learning
rate of 0.001. The simple and bidirectional nets used a time
interval t = 1 while the inception-like net used t = 1, 2, 3
simultaneously. L2 regularization was used on the parameters
of the fully connected layer. Dropout on the input sequence
didn’t seem to help significantly reduce overfitting in our
experiments so results were omitted.
Results reported with Linear Support Vector Machine
(SVM) [18], Logistic Regression [19], and Random Forest [20]
were trained on a single time unit at a time, i.e. a one-
dimensional vector representing t seconds rather than a block
of multiple time units (two-dimensional matrix). At test time,
a process was classified using a majority vote over the multiple
vectors representing it.
All the results reported are in terms of precision and recall
per process (Table I). More precisely, the precisions and recalls
over the different classes are averaged, this metric is known
as macro-average precision and recall.
Model Precision Recall
Logistic Regression 0.843 (1e-16) 0.815 (1e-16)
Linear SVM 0.850 (1e-16) 0.827 (1e-16)
Random Forest 0.860 (0.006) 0.838 (9e-05)
Simple net 0.916 (0.01) 0.922 (0.003)
Bidirectional net 0.923 (0.01) 0.923 (0.003)
Inception-like net 0.924 (0.01) 0.925 (0.003)
TABLE I: Results for the laboratory setup. Results and stan-
dard deviations reported in parenthesis were obtained with 10
independent runs of the algorithms. A detailed description of
the models is discussed in the main text.
B. Production Environment
The results in the production environment (Table II) were
obtained by training the model on data from one set of servers
and evaluating the trained model on the data from a different
set of servers, which makes the task more challenging. The
servers may in general have different configurations, types and
numbers of CPUs, and amounts of memory installed. Still, the
model is able to generalize well on similar processes among
different servers. The experiment was done on 20 different
processes and the hyperparameters of the models were similar
to the ones used for the laboratory setup.
Model Precision Recall
Logistic Regression 0.791 (1e-16) 0.741 (1e-16)
Linear SVM 0.792 (1e-16) 0.741 (1e-16)
Random Forest 0.850 (0.02) 0.795 (0.02)
Simple net 0.957 (0.03) 0.918 (0.03)
Bidirectional net 0.948 (0.04) 0.911 (0.04)
Inception-like net 0.965 (0.02) 0.931 (0.01)
TABLE II: Results for the production environment. Results
and standard deviations reported in parenthesis were obtained
with 10 independent runs of the algorithms. A detailed de-
scription of the models is discussed in the main text.
VI. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
The stream of system calls is a rich source of information
about a computer system, but exact processing of the stream is
impractical. Through a novel scheme which enables efficient
processing of the stream while preserving properties essential
for security and health monitoring, we are able to address sev-
eral monitoring tasks at large scale with more than satisfactory
accuracy. Future work is concerned with further advancing
machine learning algorithms, as well as with moving from
plain count vectors to a more compact but still as informative
data representation.
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